In this chapter we extend earlier work (Vinuesa et al., Nat Commun 11, 2020) on the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) to achieve the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) proposed by the United Nations (UN) for the 2030 Agenda. The present contribution focuses on three SDGs related to healthy and sustainable societies, i.e., SDG 3 (on good health), SDG 11 (on sustainable cities), and SDG 13 (on climate action). This chapter extends the previous study within those three goals and goes (...) beyond the 2030 targets. These SDGs are selected because they are closely related to the coronavirus disease 19 (COVID-19) pandemic and also to crises like climate change, which constitute important challenges to our society. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 697 however, that extreme caution is to be advised upon entering those waters? Fully respectful of this concern, Professor Stambaugh enjoins the reader to "reach his own conclusions about parallels and affinities" concerning "some strains of Nietzsche's thought that are most consonant with an Eastern temper of experience." DAVID B. ALLISON SUNY, Stony Brook W. J. Mander. An Introduction to Bradley's Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press, (...) 1994. Pp. viii + 175. Cloth, $39-95. T. L. S. Sprigge. James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality. Chicago: Open Court, 1993. Pp. xiv + 63o. Cloth, $66.95. Paper, $29.95Until the appearance of Mander's book there had been no short general introduction to Bradley in print since Penguin dropped Wollheim's F. H. Bradley from their list. But in any case, as a result of the work of scholars since its last revision in 1969, Wollheim's account, despite its many virtues, is now known to be misleading in crucial places, for he remained to some extent in the grip of the dismissive caricature of Bradley bequeathed to analytic philosophers by Russell and Moore and stilloften just taken for granted. (See, e.g., almost any textbook which has a chapter on truth.) By drawing on this scholarship Mander offers us a philosopher strikingly different from this caricature. Mander's replacement portrayal is, in its broad outlines, accurate enough to be confidently recommended as giving a good general sketch of Bradley's views (excepting the ethics, which Woliheim managed to include), presenting them sympathetically but not completely uncritically in a way which should offer something of interest to both advanced undergraduates and their teachers. As Oxford has also recently published a selection from Bradley's works (Writings on Logic and Metaphysics, edited by James Allard and Guy Stock, with both general and topic-specific introductions), there is the added benefit that one who wishes to read him can now do so without being faced with wading through some intimidatingly large volumes of often meandering discussion in baffling prose. The two should make a good pair around which to structure classes concerning Bradley. I am not quite so confident about some of the detail of Mander's account, which is, moreover, sometimes explained in a way nearly as obscure as the original on which it is intended to cast light. This last is, of course, hard to avoid in expounding a writer whose whole cast of mind is opposed to the exact formulation of precise theses illustrated with clear examples, and is less misleading than artificial precisification; it also perhaps reduces the risk that students will use it as a substitute for, rather than a guide to, the primary texts themselves. And I want to stress that Mander's overall picture of Bradley's views seems to me reliable and as well situated historically as the book's ' G. M. C. Sprung, "Nietzsche's Interest in and Knowledge of Indian Thought," in The Great Yearof Zarathuara (188z-1981), ed. David Goicoechea (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, x983), 166-8o. 698 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 brevity allows. Its usefulness is enhanced by a very full bibliography which does include some coverage of the ethics. Sprigge's massive work is far more ambitious. His aim is "to provide a comparative exposition and personal evaluation of [Bradley's and James's] main views on truth and on the general nature of reality" (xiii). He gives several reasons for selecting these two philosophers for attention: they are the most important of their time; they are misunderstood and misrepresented; and their views have much in common that is largely correct while being the main alternative solutions to the problems they confront. Further, ajoint treatment makes sense because "it is toJames, rather than Russell, let alone Moore, that we must look for a serious critique of Bradley" (417). This is a labor of love, exhibiting reading of remarkable breadth and depth and the familiarity with its subject matter that is the product only of decades of exploration. Perhaps this very familiarity is part of the explanation of an occasional paucity of textual backup for the pictures Sprigge... (shrink)

The author has made this treatise on Madhva’s realistic school of Ved?nta philosophy convincing to the modern mind by employing western logical apparatus in substantiating Madhva’s ideas. Following the Indian classical tradition, the author has examined the validity of Advaitaved?nta, the Absolute Monism of ?a?kara and Bh?skara as P?rvapak?a, and logically proved its inconsistencies. He has then established the Dvaitasiddh?nta i.e., the Monotheistic Dualism of Madhva. He has successfully brought out the nuances of the realistic school of Indian philosophical thought (...) in this work. A Modern Introduction to M?dhva Philosophy is Prof B H Kotabagi’s posthumous publication. (shrink)

This study analyzes a poem by the Twelver Shiʿi jurist Ḥusayn b. ʿAbd al-Ṣamad al-ʿĀmilī (d. 984/1576) that has recently been discovered in a multiple-text manuscript in Iran. It is argued here that the poem dates from 961–63/1554–56 and expresses the author’s disappointment and frustrations with patrons or intermediaries in his efforts to procure a position shortly after he arrived in Safavid territory.

I have become more convinced, over the years, by the truth of Wittgenstein’s characterisation of philosophy as arising through misconceptions of grammar. Such a misconception of grammar characterises a very popular approach to indexicality which has been current since the 1970s, stemming from the work of Casteñeda, and Kaplan. Gareth Evans was inclined to allow, for instance, that one could say ‘“To the left (I am hot)” is true, as uttered by x at t iff there is someone moderately near (...) to the left of x such that, if he were to utter the sentence “I am hot” at t, what he would thereby say is true’ (Evans 1985: 358). But not only does this disturb the proper relation between direct and indirect speech, it continues a Fregean tradition which these very cases show to be quite mistaken about the logic of intensions. In this paper, however, I want primarily to point out how this misconception of grammar has distorted our view of people. For some of the above thinkers have tried to make out that human motivation is related to the possession of a certain category of indexical belief, by Lewis called ‘de se beliefs’. I shall look here at how the matter arises in Hugh Mellor’s work on Time. In connection with Time, indexicality arises in McTaggart’s ‘A-series’, and Mellor treats this indexicality in parallel with Evans’ language. First, therefore, I aim to show how Mellor’s discussion of Time grammatically misconceives the situation, and leads to a misrepresentation of the motivation of human action. But a larger conclusion about Fregean intensions is also then immediately available. (shrink)

Concepts of stability and symmetry in irreversible thermodynamics are developed through the analysis of system energy flows. The excess power function, derived from a local energy conservation equation, is shown to yield necessary and sufficient stability criteria for linear and nonlinear irreversible processes. In the absence of symmetry-destroying external forces, the linear range may be characterized by a set of phenomenological coefficient symmetries relating coupled forces and displacements, velocities, and accelerations, whereas rotational phenomena in nonlinear processes may be characterized by (...) skew-symmetric components of the phenomenological coefficients. A physical interpretation of the nature of the skew-symmetric parts is given and the variational principle of minimum dissipation of energy is related to a stability criterion. (shrink)

Speaking of Professor Geach's belief that pronouns in natural language function like the bound variables in quantification theory, Gareth Evans, in ‘Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses - I’ says :I want to try to show that there are pronouns with quantifier antecedents that function in a quite different way. Such pronouns typically stand in a different grammatical relation to their antecedents, and; in contrast with bound pronouns, must be assigned a reference, so that their most immediate sentential contexts can always (...) be assigned a truth value. The relevant grammatical relation appears to be Klima's relation of ‘in construction with’. When the pronoun is in construction with its antecedent, as in [‘Some man loves his mother’] and [‘No man is happy when he is in love’] the result is a bound pronoun. (shrink)

Speaking of Professor Geach's belief that pronouns in natural language function like the bound variables in quantification theory, Gareth Evans, in ‘Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses - I’ says :I want to try to show that there are pronouns with quantifier antecedents that function in a quite different way. Such pronouns typically stand in a different grammatical relation to their antecedents, and; in contrast with bound pronouns, must be assigned a reference, so that their most immediate sentential contexts can always (...) be assigned a truth value. The relevant grammatical relation appears to be Klima's relation of ‘in construction with’. When the pronoun is in construction with its antecedent, as in [‘Some man loves his mother’] and [‘No man is happy when he is in love’] the result is a bound pronoun. (shrink)

The rapid rise of varieties of historicism in Germany, during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and subsequently in England and America, resulted in a radical transformation of the principles of coherence and methods of analysis within biblical studies.1This paper will argue that the foundational ‘subject/object’ metaphysics of historicism has been subverted over the past century. For this reason, historical positivism should no longer be accorded the status of ‘normative paradigm’ and ‘gatekeeper’ over and against other interpretive approaches. This paper next (...) lays out five principles for a renewed practice of historical inquiry. It argues, first, that historical inquiry continues to serve a vital function within biblical studies in its ability to call attention to historical difference, and, thereby, to contribute to a strategy of resistance to ideology and to totalizing theories; second, that the traditional appeal to historical ‘context’ and ‘author’ in the interpretation of texts continues to be a useful practice – despite the provisional and constructed nature of both – as a way of taking into account extra-lingual reference and of avoiding presentism; third, that the substitution of new ‘grand narratives’ of Christian origins in place of the (quasi-theological) ‘historical’ narrative of traditional Christianity – under the claim of historical objectivity – should be abandoned because the very concept of ‘origins’ is the result of a literalizing of a metaphor. Such totalizing narratives always reduce history's inherent polycentricism. Fourth, I will argue that the continued use of historicism in the antiquarian attempt to reconstruct the past, disconnected from both a quest for social justice and a desire for personal self-creation, represents a form of thought that alienates scholars from themselves and from their real material contexts. Finally, and following on the previous point, this paper submits that the practice of historical analysis has an ethical dimension by virtue of the fact that the personhood of the biblical historian is indissolubly linked to other dimensions of life including the social and ethical aspects of life. These added dimensions complicate the making of choices, which is implicit within all practices of interpretation. These five principles are here suggested as points of departure for the reconceptualization of the scope and function of historical inquiry within the discipline of New Testament studies. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre, in describing the realization of his freedom, was often inclined to say mysterious things like ‘I am what I am not’, ‘I am not what I am’ (‘as I am already what I will be …, I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it’, ‘I make myself not to be the past … which I am’.) He was therefore plainly contradicting himself, but was this merely a playful literary figure (paradox), or (...) was he really being incoherent? By the latter judgment I do not mean to reject his statements entirely (like many of his Anglo-Saxon contemporaries); for I believe there is an intimate link between contradiction and freedom, as I shall explain in this paper. But a minor thing we must first have out of the way is the suggestion that Sartre's language was just a rhetorical trope, designed merely to express some banal platitude in a bemusing way: ‘I am not yet what I will be’, ‘I am no longer what I was’ are sane and sensible, for instance, but cannot be the meant content of Sartre's sayings, since, while they would indeed describe the reform of some character, they would be appropriate only before or after some metamorphosis, not, as Sartre clearly intended, in the midst of some process of riddance and conversion, whether radical or otherwise. Yet, in the turmoil of such a change, ‘I am not what I am’ (or the everyday ‘I am not myself’) still, surely, cannot be true, and if that is the case, Sartre must be being inocherent, and therefore, obfuscating and deliberately obscure, and hence, it seems, must properly be rejected by all right and clear thinking men. (shrink)

Two uses of ‘if are discussed which do not involve conditions. The first is illustrated in the example ‘If he's here, I don't see him’, the second in ‘He's not a dunce, if a trifle stupid’. A third non‐conditional use, cognate with the first is also mentioned: it would be illustrated in the example ‘If he's a Dutchman, I'll eat my hat’. It is argued that recent attempts to formulate a logic of conditionals have distorted our understanding of ‘if, by (...) ignoring these uses, sometimes deliberately. Specifically, as a result, many arguments involving ‘if have been misjudged as invalid, because the expectation has been that ‘if expresses a condition. It is suggested that the traditional analysis of ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ in terms of ‘if and only if, is partly to blame for these misunderstandings. And the proper understanding of ‘if’ which emerges shows it is quite fully captured in the propositional calculus. (shrink)

One of the claims made for C. S. Peirce's existential graphs has been that they are a deductively complete formulation of first-order logic with identity. As Peirce presented them, this is true only for certain versions of first-order logic :those which do not include terms for individuals. I amend Peirce's rules here, showing, in particular, how they are capable of demonstrating that, for instance, ?Jack is in the kitchen? contradicts ?Jack is not in the kitchen?

Routley?s Formula says, for instance, that if it is believed there is a man then there is something which is believed to be a man. In this paper I defend the formula; first directly, but then by looking at work by Gensler and Hintikka against it, and at the original work of Routley, Meyer and Goddard for it. The argument ultimately reduces to a central point about the extensionality of objects in Routley, Meyer and Goddard?s intensional system, i.e. in its (...) formulation of transparency. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics was poorly received by the critics when it was first published, and only a few sympathetic commentators have made much of it since then. The book has not had a great success, because the majority of people interested in the philosophy of mathematics these days have a quite different approach to the subject from Wittgenstein. But not only that, they have a quite different logic from Wittgenstein. I believe one of the main sources (...) of the antipathy felt towards the Remarks lies in the foreignness of the logic Wittgenstein develops there. I hope, in what follows, to make that logic more understandable, and with it the philosophy of mathematics it supports. (shrink)

Speaking of Professor Geach's belief that pronouns in natural language function like the bound variables in quantification theory, Gareth Evans, in ‘Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses - I’ says :I want to try to show that there are pronouns with quantifier antecedents that function in a quite different way. Such pronouns typically stand in a different grammatical relation to their antecedents, and; in contrast with bound pronouns, must be assigned a reference, so that their most immediate sentential contexts can always (...) be assigned a truth value. The relevant grammatical relation appears to be Klima's relation of ‘in construction with’. When the pronoun is in construction with its antecedent, as in [‘Some man loves his mother’] and [‘No man is happy when he is in love’] the result is a bound pronoun. (shrink)

It is shown that: (i) the Onsager-Machlup postulate applies to nonlinear stochastic processes over a time scale that, while being much longer than the correlation times of the random forces, is still much shorter than the time it takes for the nonlinear distortion to become visible; (ii) these are also the conditions for the validity of the generalized Fokker-Planck equation; and (iii) when the fine details of the space-time structure of the stochastic processes are unimportant, the generalized Fokker-Planck equation can (...) be replaced by the ordinary Fokker-Planck equation. (shrink)

Background Informed consent confers upon participants the right to decline or accept participation in a study in equal measure. Consent declines can be used as a potential metric to assess the adequacy of the informed consent process. Limited literature is available on the reporting of consent declines in Clinical Research. We evaluated randomized controlled trials published in three high-impact factor journals for consent declines to assess the extent of exertion of autonomy by research participants. Methods CONSORT flow charts in RCTs (...) published in New England Journal of Medicine, The Lancet and Journal of the American Medical Association between 2012 and 2015 were evaluated. The total and per journal proportion of RCTs reporting consent declines was calculated. Percentage of consent declines was also compared based on number of centers and type of setting. Between-groups analysis was done using Chi Square, Chi Square for trend and a Crude odds ratio [95% C.I] were calculated. Results Only 3.7% of the published articles were RCTs. Of the 1103 RCTs, only 532 reported consent declines. JAMA had the highest RCTs reporting consent declines, the Lancet [129,150/781,924, 16.5%] had the most participants declining consent. Difference was significant using Chi square for linear trend [ p < 0.00001]. Consent decline rate was higher in developed countries relative to developing countries [cOR: 2.27, p < 0.000001] and in single centric versus multicentric studies [cOR : 3.63, p < 0.0000001]. Conclusion Both authors and journal editors need to ensure better reporting of consent declines. (shrink)

I have written a number of articles recently that have a rather remarkable character. They all point out trivial grammatical facts that, at great cost, have not been respected in twentieth century Logic. A major continuous strand in my previous work, with this same character, I will first summarise, to locate the kind of fact that is involved. But then I shall present an overview of the more recent, and more varied points I have made, which demonstrate the far larger (...) extent of basic grammar that has been overlooked or suppressed. I end with some remarks about how this phenomenon can have arisen – principally through logicians not being attentive enough to their own language, and occupying themselves, instead, with often quite imaginary languages. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre, in describing the realization of his freedom, was often inclined to say mysterious things like ‘I am what I am not’, ‘I am not what I am’ (‘as I am already what I will be …, I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it’, ‘I make myself not to be the past … which I am’.) He was therefore plainly contradicting himself, but was this merely a playful literary figure (paradox), or (...) was he really being incoherent? By the latter judgment I do not mean to reject his statements entirely (like many of his Anglo-Saxon contemporaries); for I believe there is an intimate link between contradiction and freedom, as I shall explain in this paper. But a minor thing we must first have out of the way is the suggestion that Sartre's language was just a rhetorical trope, designed merely to express some banal platitude in a bemusing way: ‘I am not yet what I will be’, ‘I am no longer what I was’ are sane and sensible, for instance, but cannot be the meant content of Sartre's sayings, since, while they would indeed describe the reform of some character, they would be appropriate only before or after some metamorphosis, not, as Sartre clearly intended, in the midst of some process of riddance and conversion, whether radical or otherwise. Yet, in the turmoil of such a change, ‘I am not what I am’ (or the everyday ‘I am not myself’) still, surely, cannot be true, and if that is the case, Sartre must be being inocherent, and therefore, obfuscating and deliberately obscure, and hence, it seems, must properly be rejected by all right and clear thinking men. (shrink)

Fregean logic has difficulty with certain arguments in which there is cross-reference between premises and conclusion. In this paper I describe a method of handling arguments of the troublesome kind: It involves replacing standard quantifiers with explicit existential statements, and turns standard logic into a free one. A validation procedure is provided for the logic.

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox as formulated in their original paper is critically examined. Their argument that quantum mechanics is incomplete is shown to be unsatisfactory on two important grounds. (i) The gedanken experiment proposed by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen is physically unrealizable, and consequently their argument is invalid as it stands. (ii) The basic assumptions of their argument are equivalent to the assumption that quantum mechanical systems are in fact describable by unique eigenfunctions of the operators corresponding to physical observables, independent (...) of any observation or measurement. Following an argument due to Furry, it is shown that this interpretation of quantum mechanics must lead to some physical predictions at variance with those of conventional quantum mechanics. A decisive experiment has been performed by Freedman and Clauser, which rules out this interpretation, and imposes severe restrictions on any alternative theory which incorporates the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen concept of physical reality. (shrink)

Sermons of ʻAbdullāh Shāh, b. 1872, Islamic scholar, on Islamic customs and practices and Muslim ethics.

With B. M. Pap. 273 , which consists of a number of fragments from a papyrus book containing an unknown epic on the subject of Dionysus and his Indian expedition, is bound up a small fragment, evidently by a different hand. This I have recently identified as from the Phaenomena of Aratus; and I therefore publish it here. Apparently no papyrus fragment of this poem has yet been discovered; there is, however, at Berlin a portion of a commentary on Aratus, (...) which has been published by Maass in his Commentariorum in Aratum Reliquiae, Berlin, 1898, pp. 556–558. (shrink)